Abstract Assassination: How Police Militarization Has Contributed to the Rise of “Swatting” by Carrico, Lucas A.
Eastern Kentucky University 
Encompass 
Honors Theses Student Scholarship 
Fall 2018 
Abstract Assassination: How Police Militarization Has 
Contributed to the Rise of “Swatting” 
Lucas A. Carrico 
Eastern Kentucky University, lucas_carrico@mymail.eku.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://encompass.eku.edu/honors_theses 
Recommended Citation 
Carrico, Lucas A., "Abstract Assassination: How Police Militarization Has Contributed to the Rise of 
“Swatting”" (2018). Honors Theses. 596. 
https://encompass.eku.edu/honors_theses/596 
This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at Encompass. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Encompass. For more 
information, please contact Linda.Sizemore@eku.edu. 
 i 
 
Eastern Kentucky University 
 
 
 
 
Abstract Assassination: 
How Police Militarization Has Contributed to the Rise of “Swatting” 
 
 
 
Honors Thesis 
Submitted 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the 
Requirements of HON 420 
Fall 2018 
 
 
 
By 
Lucas Carrico 
 
 
 
Faculty Mentor  
Dr. Travis Linnemann  
Department of Justice Studies 
 ii 
 
Abstract Assassination: How Police Militarization Has Contributed to the Rise of 
“Swatting” 
Lucas Carrico 
Mentored by Dr. Travis Linnemann of the Department of Justice Studies 
                                            Abstract 
In recent decades, police militarization has firmly planted itself at the forefront of 
academic discourse in institutions of higher learning around the globe. Various stances, 
positions, and theories have been extolled as to its origins, implications, and repercussions; 
however, this decade has produced what is arguably the most tangible embodiment of police 
militarization as a whole: swatting. Ostensibly a prank, this phenomenon entails the false 
reporting of a serious crime with the covert intention of this report being to direct as many 
heavily armed police officers to a location as possible. This phenomenon has become 
increasingly popular in the world of online gaming, with many perpetrators seeking to settle 
scores or exact revenge for breaches of gaming etiquette on individuals that are often a 
considerable distance away from them. Within the last decade, several deaths have resulted 
and numerous close calls have been brought to light following intense media coverage of high-
profile incidents, including several instances involving celebrities. While policy makers 
scramble to assign blame and institute plans to circumvent the loss of any additional lives, 
many fail to recognize that this is merely the latest symptom of a desperately ill criminal justice 
system. This thesis will demonstrate that swatting is the latest in a string of increasingly overt 
side effects of the militarization of police. To this end, both contemporary and historical 
sources will be used to illustrate swatting’s lineage; as well as to provide a prism through which 
to contemplate possible solutions to this alarming new trend.  
Key words: swatting, police, police militarization, excessive force, hoax   
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Introduction 
 Imagine a stereotypical Southern California afternoon, where a cloudless blue sky 
stands above America’s second largest city and its ever-present layer of smog. The 405 
freeway is beginning to clog up as workers head home; however, circling above this vibrant 
metropolis, an astute observer might note a swarm of news and police helicopters. Not all 
that an unusual of a sight in the congested airspace above Los Angeles, these small black 
blips in the distance seem to be making a lazy circuit no more than a few hundred feet 
above the foothills of the Santa Monica Mountains, just north of downtown. If one is at all 
familiar with the geography of the greater L.A. area, they would know that directly below 
these aircraft lie the palm-tree lined streets of Beverly Hills, the neighborhood synonymous 
with the opulence and grandeur that the City of Angels has become internationally 
renowned for. Beyond the vision of the casual downtown observer but ever so clear from 
the air is a scene rather uncommon for the ritzy suburb that is home to countless singers, 
actors, and assorted celebrities. These avenues, lined by multi-million dollar mansions and 
estates, are awash with a sea of black-and-white police cars; the vehicles standing out 
starkly against the perfectly manicured lawns of the rich and famous. As the helicopters 
maneuver above in the pursuit of the ever-elusive perfect angle for their cameras, blue-clad 
police officers mill about their patrol cars. Slowly filtering through the oversized archway  
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above the entrance to the estate in question are members of the LAPD SWAT team; who 
strut past the patrol officers, stripping off pieces of their tactical gear as they return to their 
matte black Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAPS). If one happened to be strolling 
along Rodeo Drive and came across this scene, they would be perfectly justified in 
mistaking it for the set of an upcoming action film or the next episode of a police drama. 
However, this scene is all too real and represents the limitless reach of the frightening new 
phenomenon known as “swatting.”   
 This hypothetical scene has played out repeatedly in real life, with real celebrities, 
while millions of people around the globe gleefully gobbled up the images broadcast by 
the media frenzy that inevitably follows such an event. From comedian Russel Brand to 
actor Tom Cruise to the Canadian heartthrob Justin Bieber, an ever-growing and quite 
diverse range of celebrities have all had their homes “swarmed” by police officers 
(Goldberg, CNN). While a handful of these celebrities have become infamous for their 
encounters with law enforcement, i.e. Charlie Sheen; the common theme amongst all of 
these police incidents is that they stemmed entirely from a hoax. Commonly referred to as 
“swatting”, this relatively new trend involves an anonymous call to 911 alleging a crime 
has occurred at a certain residence; an alleged home invasion in the case of Miley Cyrus 
and domestic dispute in the case of Chris Brown (Goldberg, CNN). While it is easy to 
understand how the average American would feel little to no sympathy for these uber-rich 
celebrities, unless they were a Belieber, of course; the fact of the matter is that this trend is 
in no way limited to the extravagantly wealthy. While it is likely that the first anyone heard 
of this trend was as a result of one of the aforementioned incidents, this scene has played 
out numerous times across the nation; rarely with the same cheery results. As will be 
thoroughly analyzed later in this work, far too often these “pranks” culminate with grievous 
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harm to completely innocent individuals; sometimes the target of the hoax, sometimes not. 
If nothing else is taken away from this anecdote, the fact that those located at the upper 
strata of society can be successfully targeted and so easily “touched”, with a mere phone 
call no less, should be exceptionally frightening to those that do not enjoy the advantages 
of wealth, power, etc.   
 One may be left questioning how, in a nation whose entire existence is ostensibly 
based upon the concept of personal liberty and the preservation of life, such a travesty 
could play out time and time again. Closer examination of the phenomenon would 
demonstrate that it is only within a relatively recent time frame, the mid-2000’s onward, 
that this “prank” has become so popular. Of course, it would be exceedingly easy to lay the 
blame for these instances on the proliferation of the internet and social media. After all, it 
is highly unlikely that an adolescent in Canada or a pimple-faced teenager in Smalltown, 
U.S.A. would possess the capability, impetus, or wherewithal to carry out such an attack 
were it not for the existence of a seemingly all-knowing entity such as the internet. That is 
not to say that a determined individual could not have pulled such a stunt in the 1970’s or 
even the 1940’s; however, the relative ease with which these assailants can access and 
immediately act upon the personal information of such a wide range of individuals is 
undeniably a byproduct of the Worldwide Web. It would be even easier to point the finger 
at these individuals themselves; after all, there could not be a prank call without a prank 
caller. However, as this work will strive to demonstrate, the case can be made that the true 
root cause of these incidents, especially the seemingly lesser-covered non-celebrity 
incidents, are a direct result of the militarization of America’s police.      
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From socio-economic oppression (Shantz, 2016) to an attempt to address the rise 
of domestic terrorism (Bolduc, 2016), the rise of the phenomenon known throughout 
criminal justice academia as “police militarization” has been interpreted from virtually 
every conceivable perspective. There exists a plethora of sources that deal directly with the 
subject as it exists today, as well as its long and storied history and the potential far-
reaching ramifications of its continued existence. However, one of the most singularly 
understated of these ramifications, or “symptoms” if you will, is arguably one of the most 
flagrant and the most deadly. While a multitude of treatises have delved heavily into law 
enforcement’s recent responses to civil unrest, such as the widely covered large-scale 
protests in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland; very little attention has been 
directed to the subject of “swatting” and its all too frequently fatal consequences.   
For the purposes of this work, the phenomenon of “swatting” and all affiliated 
variations will refer to the utilization of police forces, particularly heavily armed para-
military units commonly and colloquially known as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
Teams, for nefarious purposes by an anonymous perpetrator, often located a considerable 
distance away. Most commonly, this phenomenon manifests itself in the form of a call to 
emergency services, wherein the perpetrator claims to have witnessed or acted out a 
heinous crime at a certain address. In some instances, which will be expanded upon later 
in the work, the perpetrator goes so far as to make explicit threats against supposed hostages 
and emergency responders; thereby seeking to ensure a heavy-handed response to the call 
on the part of the police.  
This work attempts to fill the void regarding this topic within the literature 
surrounding the militarization of law enforcement; a somewhat surprising void when one 
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considers the relative regularity with which it occurs when compared with other, more 
commonly cited examples of police militarization. This end will be met via a historical 
overview and literature review of the concept of police militarization; as well as a 
representative case study that illustrates the dangers involved with swatting. Finally, a 
number of policy suggestions and recommendations will be made as to how to most 
adequately address the wide range of issues surrounding the topic. Included within these 
are recommendations are a decrease or outright cessation of the use of no-knock warrants, 
less-aggressive approaches to calls for service and, if nothing else, an increase in training 
in regard to “swatting” situations.  A similar emphasis should also be placed on “shoot, 
don’t shoot” training scenarios, as a preponderance of the innocent deaths associated with 
“swatting” have been unarmed individuals that simply failed to immediately comply with 
the commands of the officer on scene.  Finally, the physical act of initiating a “swatting” 
incident should be codified and prosecuted as a serious crime. It is worthy of note that 
efforts to this rather common sensical effect are currently underway in statehouses around 
the nation but the matter remains relatively unaddressed on a national scale. While a certain 
portion of these goals may seem lofty and idealistic at first glance, implementation of even 
a single facet of a single recommendation would reduce the risk of any further needless 
deaths and the untold trauma they wreak.  
Literature Review 
First and foremost, a thorough understanding of precisely what is meant by “the 
militarization of police” must be had before one can begin to truly appreciate just how 
critical of an impact police militarization, as well as its various accoutrements, has had on 
the meteoric rise of “swatting” within American culture. After all, one cannot begin to 
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remedy the symptoms of a disease without at first acknowledging and attempting to 
understand the disease and its underlying causes.  
For the purposes of this work, the phrase “police militarization” will refer to the 
physical distribution of military-grade weaponry, equipment, and uniforms to police 
departments throughout the United States; as well as the dissemination of para-military 
tactics imported directly from the battlefields of the Middle East. Also encompassed within 
this definition are the theoretical side effects of this dispersion of material items; i.e. the 
rise of the “warrior cop” and “us vs. them” mentality (Balko, 2014). This definition of 
police militarization is crafted intentionally broad so as to best encompass the overall 
concept police militarization, without becoming bogged down in attempting to promote 
one approach to it over another.  
Ultimately, the existence of an at least moderately militarized element in the 
average American police force is virtually undeniable; after all, a cursory examination of 
any randomly selected SWAT team is almost certain to evoke far more comparisons to the 
military than to Mayberry, as Kraska so poignantly pointed out over two decades ago 
(Kraska & Cubellis, 1997). As such, one can make the argument that the existence of 
“police militarization” be taken for granted on a certain level; particularly in terms of the 
overall trends in policing as a field. This understanding in no way implies that every police 
force in America is heavily militarized, nor does it make the claim that every SWAT team 
in America is poised to “swat” an innocent individual at a moment’s notice; however, it 
does imply that the overall militarization of the police can be taken as factual and therefore 
referred to without undue and tedious examination of the trend as a whole. With that said, 
a cursory examination of the leading theories in regard to police militarization does follow; 
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predominately due to the fact that several of the aforementioned perspectives shed a direct 
light onto the rise of swatting as a phenomenon. This is not to say that these perspectives 
are necessarily more valuable or more accurate than any of the other theories that have 
been put forth; rather, it stems simply from the fact that they will be utilized to provide 
context to the author’s claims on “swatting” and a general understanding of them is thus 
appropriate.  
Early Militarization: 
As elaborated upon extensively previously, a multitude of beliefs are held as to the 
actual origin of militarization. Some sources contend that militarization is interwoven with 
the contemporary conceptualization of law enforcement, essentially arguing that it would 
be impossible to disentangle the police and their para-military traits while maintaining any 
semblance of the current system (Coyne & Hall, 2014; Kuzmarov, 2009; Shantz, 2016). 
While this approach may be somewhat extreme in nature, it does raise the interesting point 
that the police, at least as they have been envisioned since the era of Peelian reform, have 
always been at least somewhat militaristic in nature; i.e. the use of uniforms, military 
ranking systems, hierarchical chain of command, etc. At various points in the two centuries 
that have transpired since Sir Robert Peel formed the first professional police force in 
history, numerous departments have flirted with the idea of increased militarization beyond 
that of basic paramilitary structure. This trend took far longer to form in the United States, 
presumably due to the staunch separation of military and policing powers in early 
American society; a direct result of the Founding Father’s hatred and fear of an oppressive 
government (Balko, 2014). However, by the turn of the twentieth century, these sentiments 
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had begun to wane and the first distinctly “militarized” police forces in America were 
formed. 
An interesting example of one such entity is the Philadelphia Police Department, 
which gained the leadership of Marine General Smedley D. Butler in 1924 (Leichtman, 
2014). While a career in law enforcement is not all uncommon following service in the 
military, quite common in fact; the history-setting precedent stemmed from the fact that 
Butler was still an active-duty officer. While he was officially on leave, Butler only 
resigned his commission to take the job of police chief upon being directly ordered to do 
so by President Coolidge.  
Not at all surprising given his prior position, Butler set about molding the 
Philadelphia Police Department into a far more military-esque organization. Included 
within this restructuring was an emphasis on firearms proficiency, arrest rates, and strict 
enforcement of prohibition laws; all common concerns of contemporary police forces. It is 
interesting to note that his police force became so aggressive, particularly in regard to their 
enforcement of the liquor laws of the Prohibition-era; that the public outcry became so 
great, the mayor openly campaigned for his removal. If police raids on the thinly-veiled 
speakeasies of the 1920’s were enough to illicit public outrage, it causes one to ponder 
what those citizens would think of the routine use of no-knock warrants on private 
residences just a short century later.  
While the case of General Butler is an extreme one, it does serve to illustrate one 
of the earliest known instances of a “traditionally” militarized police force; that is, a police 
force explicitly modelled after the military and, more importantly, whose training directly 
reflected that of the military. The case of the Philadelphia Police Department also serves 
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to demonstrate the power of public outrage in regard to what they perceive to be excessive 
militarization and excessive use of force.  
War on Drugs: 
America’s relationship with policies restricting the manufacturing, sale, and 
possession of illicit substances seems to be indelibly intertwined with increases in the 
militarization of the police; this trend pre-dates even the Prohibition-era rise of heavily 
armed police forces such as Butler’s. However, the most common understanding of the 
origin of police militarization holds it to be a direct byproduct of Nixon-era drug policies 
and the subsequent, aptly named “War on Drugs”; easily understandable when one 
considers that it was this period in American history that spawned the “no-knock warrant”, 
as well as the increased emphasis on para-military tactics (Balko, 2014; Reddish, 2016). 
As will be analyzed later in the work, both of these trends have been mainstays of 
“swatting” incidents in the past decade. This general understanding does not limit itself to 
the administration of Richard Nixon alone, as the War on Drugs only escalated throughout 
the 1980’s and into the early 1990’s. Increasingly severe sanctions, as well as several drug 
“pandemics”, were utilized to justify the increasing reliance upon SWAT teams (Balko, 
2014). 
While these “para-military units” as Kraska deems them, slightly pre-dated the War 
on Drugs, the first having been created within the Los Angeles Police Department as a 
direct response to the race riots of the 1960’s; there is no denying that they flourished and 
their prevalence grew exponentially as a direct result of their utilization against the 
increasingly vague “enemy” in the Drug War. As one might logically expect, this time 
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period was also host to the first “accidental” fatalities related to what would later become 
known police militarization (Balko, 2014). 
War on Terror: 
The terror attacks that took place on September 11, 2001 are, without a doubt, the 
single most influential events in recent history; particularly in regard to where the field of 
policing is concerned. The subsequent fanatical devotion to concepts such as “homeland 
security” and “risk theory” have had far-reaching ramifications; both at home and abroad 
(Bolduc, 2016; Brown, 2011; O’Brien, Weiss, & Davis, 2013). One impact that branches 
both of those spheres is that of the 1033 Program, a Homeland Security program in which 
police departments from municipalities around the country can acquire military-grade 
weaponry, equipment, and supplies; often identical to those being utilized on the 
battlefields of the Middle East (Radil, Dezzani, & McAden, 2017). Recent terror attacks 
around the globe, as well as fiscal conservatism, have been used to justify this transfer of 
materiel between the military and police forces around the country; two entities that are 
ostensibly distinct from one another, yet seem to consistently overlap. 
Ultimately, it has been the recent instances of civil unrest in the wake of police-
involved shootings that has brought police militarization to the forefront of societal 
discourse. In particular, the heavily-mechanized and militarized approach the police 
utilized in quelling these acts of civil disobedience, in places such Ferguson, Missouri and 
Baltimore, Maryland; have brought about fierce condemnation and public outrage in 
relation to the increasingly militarized tinge of American policing. Widely disseminated 
images of police officers dressed in olive drab and solid black BDU’s (Battle Dress 
Uniforms) riding into the fray upon MRAP’s, many wielding military-style assault rifles 
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and grenade launchers, seemed to strike many Americans, seemingly unaware of the 
commonality of these items, to the very core. As the dust settled, investigative journalists 
began to dig into how exactly these supplies came into the possession of relatively small 
police departments around the nation. Perhaps more importantly, this public outcry spurred 
many criminal justice academics to launch various studies into numerous topics directly 
affiliated with the initial police-involved shootings as well as the militarized responses; i.e. 
the potential for democratic oversight of a militarized police, the number of police-involved 
shootings, etc. (Dansky, 2016; Klinger & Slocum, 2017; Zohny, 2015). However, 
conspicuously absent from the discourse on police militarization that these incidents 
brought about was any mention of “swatting.”  
While these widespread protests are far more likely to bring about a heavy-handed 
and overtly militaristic response on the part of the police, the fact of the matter is that the 
average American is simply not going to experience that militarization aside from viewing 
it on their television or cell phone screens. However, a far greater swath of the population 
is at risk of being victimized by a “swatting incident”; after all, the sole necessities are a 
motivated perpetrator with access to a phone, a plausible story, and an address.     
Swatting in the Real World 
 Should one choose to focus solely on the ever-expanding body of scholarly 
literature surrounding police militarization, or even the essentially non-existent body of 
work on “swatting”; one would likely be left pondering the age-old question: “so what?” 
After all, the average American will likely never take part in a large-scale protest or act of 
civil disobedience worthy of a heavy-handed police response; nor will they likely ever 
reside in a neighborhood where criminal activity is so rampant that police raids become a 
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common occurrence. Similarly, should one hone in specifically on the incidents of swatting 
that have been perpetrated against the rich and famous, they would also likely feel 
relatively removed from the phenomenon; perhaps even relishing the fact that even the 
decadently wealthy can’t escape the long, albeit misdirected, arm of the law. However, 
perhaps the most frightening aspect of swatting that many fail to realize is that it recognizes 
no borders, class divisions, or “good neighborhoods.” So while one may be tempted to 
wryly chuckle at the thought of Justin Bieber being dragged from his bed at gunpoint or 
shrug off an occasional police raid on the wrong house in an inner-city neighborhood, the 
fact of the matter is that swatting is a very real and exceptionally dangerous threat to every 
single American citizen. No case more perfectly illustrates this than the needless, albeit 
legal, slaying of Andrew Finch.  
 When Andrew Finch, a 28 year old father from Wichita, Kansas, awoke on the 
fateful morning of December 28th, 2017; he had no way to know that within a matter of 
hours, he would be slain over a $1.50 online wager. Perhaps he spent the day thinking of a 
Christmas gift he had received a few days earlier or making plans for a New Year’s Eve 
celebration with friends and family; completely oblivious to the fact that the course, and 
ultimately the end, of his life was being decided in the ethereal dimension that is online 
gaming. Regardless of how he spent his final hours prior to fatefully answering his front 
door, during that time he was completely oblivious to a tragic chain of events that had been 
set in motion hours earlier; a chain of events that he was in no affiliated with, connected 
to, or even aware of.  
 According to The Wichita Eagle, this chain reaction first began to form in the 
chatrooms of an online session of the popular video game known as Call of Duty: WWII. 
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Here, two groups of players initiated a dispute over a $1.50 bet they had made with each 
other, as well as over an accidental “friendly fire” incident on the game. At 3:52 P.M., 
screenshots from Twitter show an unidentified Twitter account allegedly belonging to one 
of the gamers involved in the initial disagreement encouraging another Twitter user by the 
name of “@SWAuTistic” to “try some shit” at 1033 W. McCormick St., Wichita, Kansas. 
What followed that churlish exchange would inexorably alter the lives of numerous people 
and end with the death of a 28 year old father and the arrest of a 25 year old; all over a 
buck and a half.   
The Wichita Eagle established the following timeline from the press releases and 
recordings provided by Wichita P.D. At 6:10 P.M., the front desk of the Wichita City Hall 
received a number of calls from a number with a local area code. The caller stated to the 
security officer who answered that he had struck his father over the head with a handgun. 
At 6:18 P.M., the security officer managed to transfer the call to emergency services where 
a 911 operator then takes over the call. The caller then tells that the operator that he has 
shot his father in the head and that he is no longer breathing. During the course of the phone 
call, the caller states that his address is 1033 W. McCormick St. and that he is holding his 
mother and brother hostage. Within three minutes, at approximately 6:22 P.M., the first 
officers began arriving on scene. At the same time, the caller states to 911 dispatch that he 
wants to kill himself and set the house on fire. Shortly after the arrival of the police, Finch 
opened the front door of his house at 1033 W. McCormick St. and stepped out onto the 
front porch. Within a matter of five minutes, Finch lay mortally wounded on his front 
porch; the recipient of a single round fired by an officer on the north side of the house. He 
was quickly rushed to a nearby hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 7:03 P.M. 
(Burgess, 2018) 
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 Officers claim that Finch failed to comply with their commands and made a quick 
movement towards his waistband and, despite the fact that he was ultimately determined 
to be unarmed in the subsequent investigation, recently released footage from the incident 
does seem to corroborate the officer’s claims that his hands strayed towards his beltline 
(Manna, 2017). However, what is not clear, is whether or not Finch realized that he was 
the focus of the police response or if he simply stepped out onto the porch to see what the 
commotion in the street was about. Of course, the possibility also exists that Finch 
misunderstood the officers’ multiple commands or became frightened and acted without 
thinking. After all, Finch had not placed a call to the police nor was he aware of any event 
worthy of a police response so one can only imagine that he was quite perplexed by the 
swarm of officers arriving in his residential neighborhood. Irrespective of Finch’s logic or 
lack thereof, whether or not the officer was justified in their decision to fire at Finch 
remains a subject of debate, a debate that continues to rage and that directly correlates back 
to the topic of police militarization.  
The simple fact of the matter is that Andrew Finch, at that exact moment in time 
was a perfectly law-abiding and innocent citizen; yet he lost his life as a direct result of the 
actions of an individual that he had never met or interacted with, residing some 1400 miles 
away. Perhaps the most tragic and morbid twist in this sardonic tale is the fact that the 
caller, subsequently identified by the police as Tyler Barriss of Los Angeles, California; 
was on the line with 911 both during and after Finch’s fatal shooting, according to The 
Wichita Eagle. In fact, news reports have stated that Barriss remained on the line for at 
least 16 minutes following the shooting and continued to make insidious claims; such as 
that his gun was black, he had his mother and brother at gunpoint, and that he had doused 
the house in gasoline (Burgess, 2018). Whether or not officers were aware of the fact that 
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emergency services were still on the line with the caller prior to and after their arrival has 
never been established. Several inconsistencies also exist between the house that the caller 
described and the house the address correlated with; whether or not officers were aware of 
this is also unknown. Ultimately, in albeit 20/20 hindsight, numerous red flags existed that 
indicated the caller was possibly making a false report.   
By the following afternoon, Barriss had been placed under arrest but not before he 
could tweet “That kids house that I swatted is on the news” and “I DIDN’T GET ANYONE 
KILLED BECAUSE I DIDN’T DISCHARGE A WEAPON AND BEING A SWAT 
MEMBER ISNT MY PROFESSION” from his “@SWAuTistic” Twitter account 
(Burgess, 2018). An individual claiming to be “@SWAuTistic” also conducted a Skype 
interview with a popular Youtuber in which the caller claimed to be renowned for his 
swatting escapades, boasting that he had “evacuated” numerous buildings and events with 
false bomb threats. He also noted that he rarely targets “people” but would on occasion do 
it for money or to “teach a lesson” to someone that didn’t fear him, such as the Twitter user 
that he had the exchange with and who provided him with Finch’s address (DramaAlert). 
These claims seem to be supported by the Los Angeles Times, who have reported that 
Barriss “pleaded no contest to charges of making false bomb threats in the Los Angeles 
area in recent years, sparking evacuations at a Glendale television station and two schools” 
and that “Glendale police believe he was involved in at least two dozen other swatting and 
hoax calls around Southern California” (Queally, 2018). They have also reported that the 
Los Angeles Police Department was already investigating Barriss for making similar calls 
when he swatted Finch and that Canadian authorities have issued an arrest warrant for 
Barriss because they believe he perpetrated a swatting incident there as well, underscoring 
the borderless nature of swatting.  
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The police, who managed to track Barriss down by the Los Angeles Public Library 
Wi-Fi signal he used to tweet from, have also charged the two gamers that allegedly took 
part in the initial squabble. The Wichita Eagle reports that 18 year old Casey S. Viner of 
North College Hill, Ohio, and 19 year old Shane M. Gaskill of Wichita, Kansas, have both 
been indicted on multiple charges of wire fraud, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice 
(Leiker and Potter, 2018). Press releases allege that, following Viner’s initial 
encouragement of Barriss, he went so far as to provide him with an address that he believed 
to be Gaskill’s. Ever the conscientious swatter, Barriss proceeded to follow the Twitter 
account of his perspective victim so as to confirm the address and other details provided 
by his initial contact. Upon seeing that an account by the name of “@SWAuTistic” was 
following him, Gaskill began direct messaging Barriss and went so far as to both confirm 
the information and taunt Barriss with messages such as “I'll be waiting” and “You're gonna 
try and swat me its (sic) hilarious.” Approximately twenty minutes after those messages, 
Barriss placed his first call to the security desk of the Wichita Police Department located 
inside of the Wichita City Hall. Around an hour and a half following Finch’s slaying, 
Gaskill direct messaged Barriss again, telling him to “delete everything” because “this is a 
murder case now.” Gaskill also admitted that he had given Barriss his former address and 
that he had been in contact with Viner, who he stated had also deleted evidence (Leiker 
and Potter, 2018). 
While Barriss is undeniably deserving of some form of punishment from the justice 
system, he does make a compelling point. After all, his phone call was just that, a phone 
call. Despite the fact that the police who responded were not SWAT officers, did their 
aggressive, “shoot first and ask questions later” approach to the situation not escalate the 
situation and ultimately result in Finch’s death? In the end, accepting the fact that both the 
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police and Barriss played a role in bringing about Finch’s untimely demise opens the door 
to a wide range of possible solutions that wouldn’t otherwise be affiliated; preeminent 
among those being an increased emphasis on training about swatting, reform in how police 
officers approach calls for service, a review of the use of no-knock warrants, and 
ultimately, a definitive criminalization of the role of the initial caller or “swatter.”  
Recommendations 
 Having established both the academic context and real-world existence of 
both police militarization and “swatting”, one is ultimately left with the dilemma of how 
to best address these distressing and seemingly synergistic phenomena in an effective and 
cost-efficient manner. In an ideal world there would be no need to concern oneself with 
cost, as most everyone would agree that preventing the death of a single innocent individual 
is incalculably valuable. However, in acknowledging the ever-shrinking budgets of most 
all jurisdictions, one must attempt to mitigate the cost associated with these remedies as 
much as possible; if for no other reason than to make the solutions as widely applicable as 
possible. After all, not every police force is fortunate enough to have the resources at their 
command as the L.A.P.D. or N.Y.P.D.  
To that end, this work will present four recommendations that attempt to balance 
cost efficiency and effectiveness. Chiefly among these being training that encourages less 
aggressive approaches to calls for service be employed; followed by a review of the 
nation’s stance on the use of no-knock warrants, a hallmark of contemporary police 
militarization. Another potential life-saver would be training that explicitly addresses the 
existence and prevalence of “swatting”, as well as training on indicators that officers may 
be dealing with an incidence of “swatting.” Finally, while legislation does not solve 
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everything, a uniform stance on “swatting” by legislative bodies around the nation, and 
ideally the world, would aid greatly in simplifying the prosecution of these perpetrators. 
Less-Aggressive Approaches to Calls for Service: 
 One of the more underappreciated aspects of the militarization of America’s police 
forces is the role that military tactics play in day-to-day policing techniques. That is to say, 
beyond the relatively rare incidences when fully armored police units are called upon to 
quell riots and scenes of civil unrest, a surprising number of departments are dispatching 
heavily armed and armored officers to calls for service. Perhaps the most common of these 
uses falls under the umbrella of the War on Drugs, wherein fully tactical police units storm 
the homes of suspected drug dealers in order to arrest them on drug-related charges; 
however, these same units are also routinely used to respond to calls in relation to domestic 
violence situations and shooting investigations. Nor does the dissemination of militarized 
equipment or tactics cease there, as many patrol officers now go about their days in what 
can appear to be full battle kit (Balko, 2014). Gone are the days of the snazzy blue uniform 
and .38 Smith & Wesson; even the days of 9mm Berettas and bulletproof vests worn under 
the uniform are giving way to BDU’s, tactical vests, and AR-15’s.   
While it is true that SWAT teams were first created to respond to active shooter 
situations, such as school shootings, incidents of work-place violence, sniper situations, 
etc.; it should also be noted that they were a last-ditch effort, to be utilized solely when all 
other measures had failed and the situation had escalated to a point that regular patrol 
officers could not handle it (Balko, 2006). However, as a result of the rapid increase in the 
number of SWAT teams in both rural and smaller jurisdictions, many are comprised 
entirely of patrol officers that only serve in a SWAT capacity when called upon. Often, 
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these officers only train sporadically and essentially act as volunteer SWAT officers; not 
unlike the volunteer fire departments found in these same small communities. With almost 
85% of police departments in the United States having a SWAT team (Balko, 2014), due 
in no small part to the 1033 Program and other government incentives noted earlier; it is 
only logical that at least a few of these departments have failed to adequately oversee the 
use of this military-grade hardware. Even those departments that do not allow their officers 
to patrol in full tactical gear often allow them to carry their gear with them in their patrol 
vehicles; ostensibly so that they can rapidly don the garb and weaponry at a moment’s 
notice and immediately respond to whatever issue is at hand. Unfortunately for some, the 
“issue at hand” is a swatting incident and the results of this unfortunate scenario can be 
fatal, as demonstrated by the case of Andrew Finch who was felled by a single rifle round 
from a responding officer.  
Even if one is able to ignore the obvious sociological issues associated with 
patrolling a neighborhood in California or Maryland in a manner eerily similar to the way 
American soldiers patrol neighborhoods in the Middle East, the simple fact remains that 
these patrol officers, even those that merely possess the military-grade equipment and have 
it stowed away in the trunk of their patrol vehicle, are now more likely to approach calls 
for service with a militarized mindset. That is to say, they are potentially more likely to 
respond to these calls in an aggressive manner than if they had arrived in a normal patrol 
car, wearing normal uniforms, without the added psychological variable of having an 
awesome amount of firepower at their discretion. As Radley Balko notes in Rise of the 
Warrior Cop (2014), some jurisdictions have even gone so far as to send officers to conduct 
live-fire training exercises with active-duty special forces teams. While there are those who 
would argue that an officer in a uniform and standard issue Crown Vic is still representative 
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of a military occupier in some neighborhoods and those that would contend the 
dangerousness of the job justify the use of such tactics and equipment, it is only logical 
that a more militarized police force would be more likely to utilize military-like tactics than 
a police department that sticks to more traditional approaches.  
 To utilize a previously noted example, the Wichita Police Department has a rate of 
officer-involved shootings that is 12 times the national average. The Finch family attorney 
is alleging in a federal lawsuit he has filed on their behalf against the city and the police 
department that it was this police culture, along with a lack of training about swatting in 
general, that led to Andrew Finch’s death (Shen, 2018). In essence, they are arguing that 
the mentality of the responding officers played a large and potentially decisive role in the 
way in which the unfortunate situation ultimately transpired.  
Ultimately, it is undeniable that a number of the fatal and near-fatal swatting 
incidents are due in large part to this increasingly aggressive, “shoot first and ask questions 
later” approach to calls for service. After all, the vast majority of the victims of swatting 
incidents are entirely innocent of any crime; yet they still find themselves on the receiving 
end of flashbangs, battering rams, and .223 rounds.  
No-knock Warrants: 
 One of the traditional hallmarks of the discourse on police militarization is that of 
“no-knock” warrants. A wide range of authors have analyzed the topic over the years 
(Balko, 2006, Balko, 2014, Reddish, 2016); however, almost none have made the 
connection between their implementation and the desired effect of a “swatting” incident. 
After all, the no-knock warrant is a direct result of the War on Drugs and is traditionally 
analyzed in that light. Originally stemming from a fear that drug possessors would be able 
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to dispose of incriminating evidence before answering the police at the door, no-knock 
warrants have slowly been transformed into a normal facet of policing. The sole 
requirements for obtaining a warrant of this kind are a “compelling” reason and a 
sympathetic, or apathetic, judge.   
Ignoring the obvious safety hazards and Fourth Amendment implications, it also 
bears noting that no-knock warrants are the best case scenario for a swatter and the worst 
case scenario for a victim of swatting. That is to say, if given the choice between the police 
simply knocking on the door of the victim or blowing it open and storming inside in full 
tactical gear, there really is little doubt as to which the perpetrator would choose. A quick 
YouTube search of the term “swatting” will bring up countless videos showing online 
gamer’s livestreams being interrupted by police officers storming into the gamer’s home, 
often utilizing no-knock warrants to make an entirely unexpected entry and regularly 
catching the gamer off-guard entirely. One can only presume that the swatter is viewing 
the livestream and thoroughly enjoying the sight of their victim lying on the ground at 
gunpoint. A perfect juxtaposition of this senseless trauma is the attempted swatting of 
Jameson Lopp, a self-proclaimed “cyber-punk” well-known within the Bitcoin and crypto 
asset community (Lopp, 2018).  
In July of 2018, he spoke publicly for the first time about a swatting incident that 
was directed at his family in October of 2017. Upon returning from the gym, he found the 
entrance of his Durham, N.C. neighborhood blocked by a police cruiser. After inquiring 
about the nature of the incident and phoning his wife to warn her of the police activity, she 
informed him that the police had stopped her as they were responding to their address 
(Lopp, 2018). The local news, who Lopp stated were unaware of what swatting even was 
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prior to the event, later obtained the 911 call and ascertained that the police were there as 
a result of someone claiming that a murder had been committed, hostages had been taken, 
and the house had been rigged with explosives. The caller went on to claim that he had shot 
someone fifteen times with an assault rifle, demanded $60,000 in cash, and threatened to 
shoot any police officer that approached the house (Zarcone, 2017). The average police 
department in America would have almost certainly initiated a heavy-handed response in 
the form of an all-out assault by a SWAT team. Lopp himself noted in an online post that 
he was “lucky that the Durham Police Department is more competent and cautious than 
other departments in the United States. Had a few variables been different that day, I could 
easily be dead.” (Lopp, 2018)  
Lopp received another threatening message from a phone with a New York area 
code shortly after the swatting incident but the police informed that they had hit a dead end 
and allegedly turned the case over to the FBI, though Lopp has heard nothing from them 
and does not expect the case to ever be resolved. He has taken precautions such as installing 
a better security system and arming himself, as well as offering a $100k reward for any 
information leading to the arrest of the perpetrator, as he has stated that that he has little 
faith in the police to be able to do anything about it (Lopp, 2018). In spite of all of these 
safety measures, should someone place a call to the local police department they would be 
obligated to respond. While it is true that they would be likely to remember the house from 
the previous incident or utilize the same cautious approach, all it would take for the 
situation to turn dangerous for all involved would be one poorly trained and/or reckless 
officer or one misstep or wrong move on the part of Lopp or his family.      
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By normalizing the seemingly knee-jerk reaction that is a no-knock warrant, the 
police have opened the door to numerous misuses of their power, including their use in 
swatting incidents. As such, the case can certainly be made that the elimination of or, at a 
minimum, increased limitations and further research on the use of these assaults is 
warranted. One can only presume that the implementation of such reform would result in 
far fewer fatal incidences and likely fewer swatting episodes in general, as the swatter 
would not have the satisfaction of knowing the police are going to storm the victim’s house. 
Training: 
 The potential for reform on the part of the police does not end with no-knock 
warrants, as the police’s role in the phenomenon cannot be overstated. The need for policy 
reform and increased training does not end at the patrol officer level and a system-wide 
review is the only way to truly address this issue effectively. After all, swatting would not 
exist were it not for the ease with which the 911 system can be manipulated into producing 
the desired response. The Finch family and their attorney appear to share this sentiment, as 
they filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the City of Wichita, Kansas and the Wichita 
Police Department shortly after Andrew Finch’s death. In the lawsuit, they allege that the 
department has a history of using excessive force and that the “officers who responded to 
the home after the prank call were inadequately trained” (Sanchez, 2018). Whether or not 
those claims will turn out to be accurate or not is yet to be determined; however, it does 
perfectly illustrate the potential liability issue that poorly trained officers and dispatchers 
can pose to a department.  
That is not to say that the police dispatchers involved in past swatting incidences 
were culpable for the subsequent actions. Most, if not all, had likely never heard of swatting 
 24 
 
and almost undoubtedly failed to recognize the red flags that seem so obvious in hindsight. 
There was simply no way they could have known that the call was not legitimate due to 
the lack of information on the matter amongst the law enforcement community. However, 
it is precisely this ignorance that beckons for a thorough in-service training regimen for all 
emergency service dispatchers. These training regimens should be crafted around the 
information now possessed about the matter of swatting and instituted nationwide as 
quickly as possible. The phenomenon has existed long enough and been well publicized 
enough that there is simply no excuse for a police department to not have at least some 
portion of their policies and procedures dedicated to them. How to spot a potential swatting 
incident, how to respond once that suspicion has been confirmed and how to investigate 
them after they have occurred should all be covered in an officer’s training curriculum. 
 Given the fact that swatters typically reside some distance away from the area the 
victim is located in, they are rarely able to utilize 911 emergency lines that are based on 
geographic location. As such, they will often call non-emergency line and then, as a result 
of the nature of the call, be patched through to 911 emergency operators. While the call 
may come from a number with a local area code, easily done via an app from anywhere in 
the world with internet access; the fact that the caller did not dial 911 and instead relied on 
a non-emergency line should raise a red flag. Furthermore, the use of excessive or over the 
top descriptors of the scene should be viewed as suspect. This in no way to suggest that the 
call be taken any less seriously than any other report; however, emergency operators should 
voice their concern to officers and warn them of the potential that they be are responding 
to a totally unsuspecting scene.  
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 Similarly, police officers and other members of law enforcement should receive in-
service training about the increasing prevalence of swatting and the aforementioned 
hallmarks of a fake report. Recognizing just a single red flag could mean the difference 
between life and death for all involved. Along those lines, acknowledging the possibility 
that the incident is a hoax does not mean that officers should respond carelessly or in a 
lackadaisical manner, taking for granted that there is no threat. On the contrary, officers 
should be on an increased level of alertness when they suspect they are responding to, or 
rather perpetrating, a swatting incident. The potential volatility and unpredictable nature of 
the scene necessitate a slow and deliberate response. A potential swatting scene is not the 
time for overzealous tactics or glory-seeking “bravery.” Instead, officers must be cool, 
calm, and collected so that they can best go about diffusing the exceedingly dangerous 
situation they have found themselves thrust into. Respond too harshly and innocent 
civilians may be suffer as a result; respond too carelessly and officers may pay the ultimate 
price.  
At a certain point, training about the existence of and common features of swatting, 
i.e. a scene that does not in any way reflect what the caller stated, does little good as a result 
of poor communication with dispatch or simply a vague caller. At that point, the matter 
rests solely on the shoulders of the officers on scene. As noted earlier, their ability to 
restrain themselves and utilize tactics that do not rely on shooting first and investigating 
later are tantamount to curbing this rash of fatalities. A swatting incident is the ultimate 
personification of the fine line that officers must walk every day and goes to demonstrate 
why there can be no “off-days” in policing.   
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Criminality of Swatting: 
 While the United States’ track record with criminalization is far from stellar, the 
fact remains that swatting is not a victimless crime like bootlegging or marijuana 
cultivation. On the contrary, the phenomenon has an exceedingly wide and all too real 
range of victims, a small sample of whom were noted previously. As such, both federal 
and state legislators must arrive at a conclusion on the criminality of swatting and they 
must do so rapidly. While it is true that legislation is not the answer to all of the world’s 
woes, the fact remains that actions have consequences and a key step towards ensuring 
justice for swatting victims is clarifying the legality of swatting. An example of this is the 
slaying of Andrew Finch and subsequent prosecution of all involved.   
    In that case, the perpetrator, Tyler Barriss, was charged with “involuntary 
manslaughter, false information and hoaxes, cyberstalking, threatening to kill another or 
damage property by fire, interstate threats, conspiracy and several counts of wire fraud” 
(Burgess, 2018). In November of 2018, Barriss pled guilty to “51 federal charges involving 
fake bomb threats, murders and other violence reported at schools, shopping centers, TV 
stations, homes and government buildings across the country.” He stands to be sentenced 
in January of 2019 for what the prosecutor’s office boasted would be “a significant amount 
of time.” The prosecutor told the press that the recommended sentence is 20 years, along 
with 5 years of parole supervision and restitution payments to the Finch family for funeral 
costs (Leiker, 2018).  
The two gamers involved in the initial dispute that escalated into the swatting 
incident have also been charged for their actions immediately following Finch’s death, i.e. 
wire fraud, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice (Burgess, 2018). It is commendable that 
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both the federal government and the Kansas state government have filed charges and are 
seeking justice for the senseless loss of life. The serious nature of the charges, as well as 
the inclusion of the initial players in the indictments, are unprecedented. However, it is 
worthy of note that the actual act of swatting is not included amongst the charges, as there 
is no consensus as to its legality and no single law addresses it and it alone. In most 
jurisdictions, so long as no death occurs, the most serious charge a swatter faces is that of 
making a false police report. However, two politicians from Finch’s hometown of Wichita 
are seeking to address just that.  
 In January of 2018, as a direct response to the tragic events surrounding Finch’s 
death and the seeming lack of legal precedent on the matter, two Kansas lawmakers “at 
opposite ends of the political spectrum have introduced a bill that would allow for murder 
prosecution if a person dies in a swatting incident” (Lefler, 2018). Specifically, House Bill 
2581 would make any false call to emergency services a misdemeanor, with the charge 
being upgraded to a felony if the caller in anyway masks their identity or provides a false 
identity. Finally, should someone die as a result of the false report, the caller would be 
subject to punishment comparable to second degree murder as “prosecutors would also 
have an option to prosecute swatting fatalities under the state’s murder statutes” (Lefler, 
2018). 
 On a national level, prior even to Finch’s highly publicized slaying, Representative 
Katherine Clark of Massachusetts introduced legislation in Congress that would have made 
swatting a federally recognized crime in and of itself. Specifically, H.R. 4057, or the 
“Interstate Swatting Hoax Act”, sought to penalize “whoever, with the intent to cause an 
emergency response by any law enforcement agency, in the absence of circumstances 
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requiring such a response, uses a telecommunications system, the mails, or any other 
facility of interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly transmit false or misleading 
information indicating that conduct has taken, is taking, or will take place that may 
reasonably be believed to constitute a violation of any State or Federal criminal law, or 
endanger public health or safety” (Congress, 2015). First introduced in November of 2015, 
H.R. 4057 explicitly stated that any attempt at swatting would have been punishable by up 
to a year in jail, an emergency response would have been punishable by up to 5 years in 
prison, serious bodily harm as a result of that response would have brought up to 20 years, 
and finally, a death as a result of the response would hold the potential for life 
imprisonment for the swatter. The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations but, as of this writing, nothing has come 
of it. However, less than 3 months after introducing the bill, Representative Clark became 
a victim of swatting herself.  
 According to a Boston Globe report on February 1st, 2016, Representative Clark 
and her husband had just begun watching television after putting their children to bed when 
they noticed a sea of police lights on their quiet street in the Boston suburb of Melrose. 
Upon investigating what the commotion was about, Clark found cruisers blocking both 
ends of her street and police officers sweeping her property in search of an active shooter. 
A police spokesman later stated that the Melrose Police Department business line, not the 
emergency line, received a call at 9:57 P.M. An automated voice “referred to ‘shots fired 
and an active shooter’ at Clark’s address” (Miller, 2016) but the responding officers 
quickly determined the report to be false and are pursuing an investigation into who made 
the call and why. Clark herself has stated, both to the Globe and to NPR’s Rachel Martin 
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in a subsequent interview, that she believes her targeting was a direct result of the bill she 
introduced in Congress (National Public Radio, 2018).  
 While the first report on swatting may have been published by the FBI (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2008) in 2008, a decade later there is still little to no national 
consensus on the crime. States such as Kansas have taken their own initiative and put forth 
bills to address the phenomenon but, aside from federal wire fraud and conspiracy charges, 
the federal government has never truly intervened in a swatting case. Given the interstate, 
and often international, nature of the trend, it will remain incredibly difficult to effectively 
seek justice for swatting victims until the federal government decides to set forth a statute 
that adequately addresses the serious nature of these crimes.       
Conclusion  
The fact that the might of the police can be wielded as a weapon by anyone with 
access to a telephone or computer should frighten a far greater swath of society than just 
online gamers, celebrities, and politicians. History is littered with examples of misuse of 
police power and the rise of swatting represents only the most contemporary version. One 
can only hope that this flagrant deviation from the purpose of law enforcement can bring 
about meaningful and thorough reflection as to the state of the criminal justice in the United 
States. After all, swatting is but the symptom and the crafting of the police into a weapon 
via militarization is the true sickness. Swatting could not have attained the level of 
“success” that it has were it not for the current state of the criminal justice system. In order 
to facilitate the end of this phenomenon and a return to the criminal justice system the 
founders of this country intended, a number of steps must be taken posthaste.  
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First, a training regimen must be immediately crafted that adequately addresses the 
prevalence of, as well as the warning signs associated with the phenomenon known as 
“swatting.” This training, if taken seriously, serves to prevent swatting incidents from 
escalating by enabling officers and dispatchers to recognize the red flags associated with a 
swatting incident and respond accordingly. While the police do not have the luxury of 
simply ignoring calls that they suspect to be false in nature, the way in which they handle 
these calls can have a dramatic impact on both the responding officers and the recipients 
of the police response. In essence, police would fall back on this training to preempt 
themselves from becoming engrossed in the hype of a SWAT run and overreacting to a 
chaotic scene. 
Secondly, a decrease in the use of no-knock warrants would greatly reduce the 
probability of fatal results from an instance of “swatting.” This also factors into the first 
recommendation, increased training, in that certain red flags associated with a potential 
swatting incident might necessitate a softer approach on the part of the police. That is to 
say, if certain factors exist, the call may be made to utilize an approach similar to the one 
the Durham, North Carolina Police Department utilized in the Jameson Lopp incident. 
Ultimately, without hard knowledge regarding the location in question, a mere phone call 
to 911 is scarcely enough reason to blow open the door of someone’s domicile and stream 
in with guns at the ready.   
Finally, the classification of “swatting” someone as a serious crime should be 
immediately put forth in Congress. The interstate aspect of the phenomenon renders it a 
distinctly federal crime in nature. Beyond that, federal agencies are far more equipped to 
handle an investigation that could potentially stretch across international boundaries, not 
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to mention the fact that the budgetary constraints and lack of manpower in many small to 
medium sized departments leave them virtually helpless in regard to acts such as swatting. 
Detractors will likely argue that these would be more baseless words from Washington, 
D.C. and it is certainly true that legislation can only do so much; however, a clear and 
unified stance on the legality of swatting would go a considerable way in aiding the 
successful prosecution of those that would seek to utilize the police as a weapon.  
To that end, all of the policy recommendations noted act synergistically in bringing 
about some degree of reform. The more that are put into the place, the better the results; 
however, even the implementation of a single recommendation would greatly reduce the 
risk of any further loss of life as a result of swatting. Similarly, virtually all of the 
recommendations, sans the legislation specific to swatting, can be extrapolated into the 
conversation regarding police militarization. While all of these measures may seem 
common sensical, the fact remains that they cannot be instituted without policymakers and 
the general citizenry being aware of their necessity. In the end, perhaps the greatest long-
term solution to swatting is an increase in the understanding of just how senseless and 
tragic of a phenomena it truly is. After all, no amount of legislation of training can bring 
Andrew Finch back to his family and one can only hope that others may be spared the pain 
of loss.  
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